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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BEFORE THE HONORABLE CHARLES R. BREYER, JUDGE

BLIZZARD ENTERTAINMENT, INC.,)
AND VALVE,)
Plaintiff,)

VS.) No. C 15-4084 CRB

LILITH GAMES (SHANGHAI) CO. LTD., and UCOOL, INC.,

Defendants.

San Francisco, California Friday, April 8, 2016

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff:

MITCHELL SILBERBERG & KNUPP LLP 11377 West Olympic Boulevard Los Angeles, California 90064-1683

BY: MARC E. MAYER, ESQUIRE

For Defendant uCool, Inc.:

QUINN, EMANUEL, URQUHART & SULLIVAN LLP 555 Twin Dolphin Dr. - 5th Floor Redwood Shores, California 94065

BY: CLAUDE M. STERN, ESQUIRE EVETTE D. PENNYPACKER, ESQUIRE

Reported By: Katherine Powell Sullivan, CSR No. 5812, RMR, CRR Official Reporter

Friday - April 8, 2016

10:03 a.m.

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PROCEEDINGS

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THE CLERK: Calling civil action 15-4084, Blizzard Entertainment, Inc. et al. versus Lilith Games.

6 7 Counsel, please step forward to the podium and state your appearances.

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MR. MAYER: Good morning, Your Honor. Marc Mayer for the plaintiffs.

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THE COURT: Good morning.

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MR. STERN: Good morning, Your Honor. Claude Stern and Evette Pennypacker, of Quinn Emanuel, on behalf of uCool.

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THE COURT: Good morning.

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MR. STERN: Good morning.

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THE COURT: So, as we know, the Court had granted the defendant's motion with respect to the original -- I think it was the original, might have been the first, but I think it was the original complaint. Pointed out some defects -- as the Court viewed it, some defects -- primarily, that the plaintiff failed to meet their burden of alleging in detail copyright

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ownership and failed to identify their aspects of their work

that the defendant infringed, and granted leave to amend.

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23 And now the defense has -- pardon me, plaintiffs have

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amended their complaint. And it appears to successfully

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address those shortcomings.

The question, of course, is, you know, how to really test the evidence in the case. I mean, is there really a conflict? And what is the evidence in the case? Which I think is more appropriately addressed through a summary judgment motion than it is on a motion to dismiss, as I see it, because I think that the complaint is successful in stating the claims.

But I think I have to turn to the defense and ask them if they want to add to this and try to talk me out of it.

Whatever you feel comfortable doing. But, you know, tentatively -- and I usually give a tentative just because I think it then focuses the parties' argument.

Yes.

MS. PENNYPACKER: Thank you, Your Honor. I would like to address your question. In particular, the question, it seems to me, that you're asking is whether this is the proper time to look at the --

THE COURT: Yes, that's exactly the question.

MS. PENNYPACKER: And we would submit that it is, Your Honor, because in the cases that we have cited to you, the issue of ownership was decided as a matter of law. And, candidly, they weren't motion-to-dismiss cases. But at the time that those cases were decided, the same evidence that you have before you now was before those courts. And they decided the issue as a matter of law.

Plaintiff has not indicated that there would be any

additional evidence to consider but, rather, has simply argued that we shouldn't decide this now as a procedural matter.

And I'm not sure that plaintiffs would be able to come forward with any additional such evidence --

THE COURT: If that's true -- and I appreciate your remarks. If that's true, though it requires you to essentially refile and make your argument that there is no further evidence or that the evidence is in conflict on any material aspect, isn't it much better to go up on appeal -- if there is an appeal -- on that record than on something in which the test is, you know, the test for a motion to dismiss?

The problem I've always found in 20 years or so is that you can't predict with any degree of certainty across the board in cases how motions to dismiss which are granted are treated by an appellate court.

And it seems to me there is a real predisposition by appellate courts to be very technical on motions to dismiss, and far less so on summary judgment. That is, they say, okay, everybody has had an opportunity to, quote, litigate, develop their record; it's a full record. Not as full as a trial would be. Full enough for these purposes. And there we are. You know, we have at it.

So I guess what I'm saying to you is, is that, as you concede, I think that these cases that you are relying on came up in the context of summary judgment. Isn't that one --

MS. PENNYPACKER: One was post trial and one was summary judgment, that's correct.

THE COURT: So you never know what goes on in people's minds. But I have to believe that they looked at it and said, okay, plaintiffs had a full, ample, adequate shot; there we are.

MS. PENNYPACKER: I --

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. PENNYPACKER: I have no way of knowing obviously.

THE COURT: I don't either. I don't either.

MS. PENNYPACKER: And I don't know, standing here today, whether or not there was even a motion to dismiss filed. What I can say is that right now the evidence that is before Your Honor is the same evidence those courts ultimately relied upon to find that ownership was -- that there was an abandonment of the copyright.

And right now, sitting here today, the complaint incorporates by reference the very agreements that show abandonment. One doesn't even need to go to a blog post or any other information that's outside what's incorporated directly by reference into the complaint.

And so right now, on this procedural posture, we are well within the bounds of what motion to dismiss will look at on the record. So we think that it would be appropriate now to look at this, and efficient for the Court because no evidence can

come in.

What those decisions that we cited to Your Honor say is even where there was deposition testimony or a declaration from an author, because that information was directly contrary to what was in the document evidence showing abandonment, the courts excluded that evidence; they didn't consider it.

And right now you have before Your Honor an affirmative statement in the original assignment agreement from the very first author of DotA, saying that the work was dedicated to the public. Twice it says that in agreement.

So it's difficult to understand what we would all gain from spending a lot more resources on litigating that.

THE COURT: I'll turn to plaintiffs.

MR. MAYER: Sure. Your Honor, I would certainly agree that this is not an issue at the pleading stage.

What we've alleged -- and, again, there are some complexities because the work we're suing on is work called DotA 2. We do have a registration. The registration is prima facie evidence of the ownership. The dispute seems to be over some of the underlying material.

What we've alleged in the complaint is we've alleged that we own that underlying material; that we own it pursuant to a series of assignment agreements. There are three particular assignment agreements that are now in the record. There's also an end user license agreement that gives certain ownership

rights.

What the defendants are doing is basically leveling a full-scale attack on the facts of our ownership. They're arguing that one of these four assignees may have abandoned his rights. And abandonment certainly is a factual issue.

There are issues here about what author contributed what; whether there may be other people that may claim some sort of amorphous authorship. But at the end of the day, there are a series of agreements. There's no dispute that there are these agreements.

And the agreements are in the record. They establish -certainly at the pleading stage they've met our burden to show
that we own or at least have sufficiently alleged ownership of
DotA. And if we want to fight down the road over who authored
what and whether there's abandonment by one of the four
authors, that's for a later day.

MS. PENNYPACKER: May I respond? Thank you.

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. PENNYPACKER: I think that, actually, plaintiff's comments confirm that this is the right time to decide this issue because the licenses are before the Court.

There is no dispute as to the contents of the license or their authenticity. They were produced by the plaintiffs in the case. They are not disputing that they are incorporated by reference in the complaint.

And in the first amended complaint the only allegation for 1 ownership of the work that we're discussing is in paragraph 26. 2 And reads, in its entirety: 3 "Pursuant to written agreements, Blizzard and Valve 4 5 collectively own 100 percent" --THE COURT: What page are you reading of the 6 complaint? 7 It is page 11, paragraph 26. 8 MS. PENNYPACKER: The last paragraph on page 11 of the first amended complaint. 9 in that paragraph it says: 10 11 "Pursuant to written agreements, Blizzard and Valve collectively own 100 percent of the copyright and all 12 original expression embodied within the DotA mod." 13 That is literally the only allegation of ownership for 14 15 that particular work. And that is, by definition, a conclusory 16 allegation. 17 So we have before Your Honor the licenses that are not in dispute. And it seems strange to have to push forward beyond 18 19 this stage when the parties are basically in agreement as to 20 those licenses. 21 And if I could have your indulgence to look at --22 THE COURT: Sure. 23 MS. PENNYPACKER: -- the license that we are talking about, I think you would understand further why we would press 24

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this at this stage.

Exhibit 1 to the LaFond declaration that was submitted with our opening papers is the license from Kyle Summer, who is known as Eul -- that's E-u-l -- to Valve. I'm sorry, he's --THE COURT: It's Exhibit 1 to the LaFond MS. PENNYPACKER: declaration, the opening LaFond declaration. THE COURT: I have it here. MS. PENNYPACKER: Thank you. THE COURT: September 27th, is that the one? MS. PENNYPACKER: Yes. It's dated September 27, 2010. And Kyle Summer, who is a party to this license to Valve, was the original creator of the DotA mod. So he isn't just any one of the authors. He is the original author of this particular work. And as Your Honor will see, in paragraph B, under the recitals, it says, "Seller" -- who is Eul/Kyle Summer. "Seller later ceased his development of the Ancients (DotA) and released his work to the public for further development." It's right there in black and white. Later, and the next paragraph, says, "To the extent seller retains any rights in defense of the Ancient, Valve desires to acquire all those rights." The second paragraph I just read references the first paragraph, to say that, We don't even know if he owns any rights.

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And then if you look further, if you turn to page 3 of that agreement, under representations and warranties, under 3.1.2, it specifically references this dedication to the public.

Under "Intellectual Property" it says, "Except for seller's foreign post on the warcenter.com formally posted at" -- and then there is a long URL I won't trouble to read into the record -- "seller has not assigned or otherwise transferred ownership of..." and then it goes on.

This makes clear that except for that dedication to the public, he has not otherwise assigned. Kyle Summer viewed that blog posting as an assignment to the public of the work that he had created for DotA. And all of that work was assigned in 2004, many, many years before this license.

This license is the foundation -- I mean, these representations are the foundation for showing the abandonment of all of the other work.

So even though plaintiffs then went and tried to clean this up by getting this license and getting licenses from others who continued to work on the DotA mod after this transfer to the public in 2004, they've never owned the original mod because Mr. Summer dedicated that to the public.

So, at most, they can possibly own things that were created thereafter. But we don't know what those things are, based on this conclusory allegation in paragraph 26. There's

nowhere in the complaint that details who owns what or who worked on what.

So we think that Your Honor actually has sufficient evidence now to rule on the issue of abandonment. It's very clear in this agreement.

We've also provided a copy of the Web post that is still available on archive.net. And that's at Exhibit 6 to the LaFond declaration. And you can see that -- I know that Blizzard has -- has contested the admissibility of this particular document, but -- not only recited case law --

THE COURT: So your point essentially, among other things, is, look they allege that Blizzard collectively and Blizzard and Valve collectively had a hundred percent of this. And the problem is that it was given away previously to the public or dedicated to the public or abandoned by the creator.

And so what can you own a hundred percent of when you didn't own it to begin with? To begin with, you may have owned it, but before the agreement was executed, before the license agreement was executed.

Certainly, they may have something subsequent to the execution of a license, but that's not what this lawsuit is about. Is it? Maybe it is. I don't know. That's their argument.

Is that fair to say that's what you're saying? I don't want to misquote you and not understand what you're saying.

MS. PENNYPACKER: I think that's correct, Your Honor.

I think our view is that this license or this dedication to the public that happened in 2004 was abandonment of the copyright in the DotA mod.

And that was the beginning of the creation of this particular work that they're suing on. And so it doesn't -- whatever happened after that, one must first look at this because this was the foundation of it.

The other thing to point out is that all of the characters that plaintiffs assert the Heroes Charge game infringes, they say are in both DotA and then DotA 2; DotA 2 being registered by Valve, a plaintiff in this lawsuit.

And if that's the case, we at least need to know which of these things are owned by whom. If all of the characters that we are accused of infringing were dedicated to the public in -- by Mr. Summer in 2004, there is no lawsuit against us on even DotA 2, if those characters appeared first in DotA and then later in DotA 2.

THE COURT: Respond?

MR. MAYER: Your Honor, these are exactly the kind of issues that are not appropriate at the pleading stage.

What we've alleged is that Blizzard and Valve collectively own 100 percent of the copyright and all original expression embodied within the DotA mod.

There are four agreements. We're now engaged in a dispute

over which agreement governs; and what was conveyed in one agreement versus a second agreement and then a third agreement; and what expression is original; and which characters were created in which version, and who created those characters.

These are all complicated --

THE COURT: So your argument essentially is that there is ambiguity -- that there are issues of fact with respect to who owns what was intended to be encompassed within these agreements and how these agreements were treated; and, therefore, that's factually intensive in their disputes with respect to that. Is that --

MR. MAYER: Yes. I'd phrase it a little bit differently, which is that there are four authors of the DotA mod. Those four authors contributed different elements. They picked up on each other's work.

THE COURT: Well, this is why I think that the motion to dismiss should be denied, because it seems to me that if you're right, you'll have an easy case. You'll be right back here in a summary judgment, and we go through it and deal with it on that basis after some limited discovery.

I don't want discovery on damages at this point. It appears to me that the discovery should be limited to the issues that essentially are liability issues as distinct from damages issues.

And maybe I'll see you back here in 90 days or 120 days,

and we'll sort through -- I don't know how long it's going to take, but we'll sort through the issues and see if you're right. At least from the Court's point of view.

I sort of look at it and say you may be right. You may be right. And I know that it seems to you and to your client sort of like a waste. And I appreciate that. But sometimes what is characterized as a waste and it gets up to the court of appeals, you know, judges look at it and they say, well, not really a waste. And then you've had a waste. Then you've really -- you've had two years of expensive litigation.

So, anyway, the motion to dismiss will be denied. And discovery will be limited to liability issues. And I'll see you back here whenever somebody is ready to come back.

Mr. Stern.

MR. STERN: Your honor, a question for you.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. STERN: And I understand Your Honor has denied the motion. I'm not rearguing it, but it is a question about the summary judgment motion that we would be focusing on.

Right now, if Your Honor reads the complaint, the complaint actually claims -- seems to claim infringement of five works. Those works are StarCraft, Diablo, World of Warcraft, DotA 1, and DotA 2. Those are the five works.

The purpose of the motion to dismiss was to say essentially on the latter half of the argument about the

similarities of the character, that gets rid of Starcraft and Diablo. On the defective registration argument, the argument Your Honor just addressed, that gets rid of DotA 1 and DotA 2. And that leaves the case being a case of Warcraft against the uCool product.

And I appreciate Your Honor has said that we should focus on the liability side of the case.

THE COURT: Well, I think you're going to get to the point of how much you have to deal with. And I think that's a very good point. And I think the answer is you can move for partial summary judgment.

You pick what I call the money issues -- see, I have no way of looking at these things and figuring out -- it's like a patent case. I have no way of looking at something where there are a number of claims to know whether this is a big item or little item; it's put in or not put in; or it's put in because of this or that or so forth.

The lawyers are in a much better position than the Court to make that determination. The lawyers are motivated by business concerns as distinct from just legal concerns. So you certainly are entitled to make a partial motion for summary judgment. And that may very well clear the brush, as it were.

MR. STERN: And, Your Honor, if we do make the motion for partial summary judgment as Your Honor suggests, we want to make sure that isn't with prejudice to any later motions in the

1	case that we may have to follow.
2	THE COURT: It won't be.
3	MR. STERN: Wonderful.
4	THE COURT: Yeah.
5	MR. STERN: Thank you, Your Honor.
6	THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much.
7	MR. MAYER: Thank you, Your Honor.
8	MS. PENNYPACKER: Thank you, Your Honor.
9	(At 10:24 a.m.the proceedings were adjourned.)
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12	CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
13	I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript
14	from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
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16	DATE: Monday, April 18, 2016
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